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CROSSING JORDAN: HOW A BARTENDING CRISIS REVOLUTIONIZED1 
THE LAW OF WORKPLACE HARASSMENT 
 
Robin R. Cockey and Laura E. Hay* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Americans work more than the inhabitants of any other 
developed country. However, because our legal system is based upon 
the common law, the laws that govern our workplace can depend upon 
such vagaries as the time it takes to make a cocktail.  The case of 
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleu Corp. illustrates this surprising but 
indisputable proposition.2 According to online mixology accounts, a 
“Hula Hula” is comprised of equal parts gin, curacao, and orange 
juice.3 Although there appears to be widespread agreement it should 
take about thirty seconds to make a Hula Hula, the laws barring 
workplace harassment, and the laws protecting workers who complain 
about it, changed significantly when a bartender in Ocean City, 
Maryland complained that a Hula Hula takes too long to make.  
The chain of events set in motion by this bartending crisis 
culminated in Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleu Corp., a landmark 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
that made it clear workers could regard even a single incident of 
targeted abuse as intolerable, and could complain about it with 
impunity.4 Thus, from small beginnings came great consequences for 
countless members of the American workforce.  
This work sets out to demonstrate the inherently random nature 
of the American legal system, in which the right facts must combine 
with the right judges on the right day in order to produce progress . 
Part I will discuss the factual background of Boyer-Liberto.5 Part II 
will give an overview of workplace harassment law in the Fourth 
Circuit prior to Boyer-Liberto.6 Parts III and IV will address in detail 
the progression of Boyer-Liberto, and how it could easily have been 
                                                 
© 2017 Robin R. Cockey and Laura E. Hay. The authors served as counsel for Ms. 
Boyer-Liberto.  
1 Perhaps a bit of hubris: The Boyer-Liberto majority felt they were simply following 
long-standing Supreme Court precedent, and said so. See Boyer-Liberto v. 
Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 284 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
2 Id. 
3 Hula Hula or Hoola Hoola Cocktail, DIFFORD’S GUIDE, 
https://www.diffordsguide.com/cocktails/recipe/2448/hula-hula-or-hoola-hoola-
cocktail (last visited Nov. 4, 2017). 
4 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d 264. 
5 See infra Part I.  
6 See infra Part II.  
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resolved under Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp.,7 the then 
controlling case law.8 Part V will offer a critical analysis of the 
majority, dissenting, and concurring opinions of Boyer-Liberto, 
examining how the majority’s approach is appropriate and why the 
dissent erred in its reasoning.9 Lastly, Part VI will explore the future of 
workplace harassment law in the Fourth Circuit and how the 
unresolved questions created by this case could be addressed moving 
forward.10  
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF BOYER-LIBERTO V. 
FONTAINEBLEU CORP 
 
The night of September 14, 2010, a traveler came into one of 
the many bars of the Clarion Hotel in Ocean City, Maryland.11 After 
some back-and-forth with the waitress, Reya Boyer-Liberto, about 
what drink to order, the traveler decided to try a “Hula Hula,” one of 
the specialty cocktails listed in the bar menu.12 Ms. Boyer-Liberto 
hurried to fill the order, anxious to avoid causing her customer more 
frustration.13 
Ms. Boyer-Liberto was experienced in the hospitality business, 
but had only worked at the Clarion for one month.14 She had 
apparently done well, as she had no disciplinary record, and – 
critically – had remained on the staff after the busy summer season 
ended on Labor Day.15 
                                                 
7 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 
786 F.3d 264, 284 (4th Cir. 2015). 
8 See infra Parts III and IV.  
9 See infra Part V.  
10 See infra Part VI.  
11 The account given here is drawn primarily from the facts presented by Boyer-
Liberto in defending a Motion for Summary Judgment as recounted by the Fourth 
Circuit. 786 F.3d at 269–71. Because the Summary Judgment standard requires the 
court to construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, i.e. 
Ms. Boyer-Liberto, it is important to remember that the Defendants would no doubt 
tell the story rather differently. Id. at 269 n.1. 
12 Id. at 269. 
13 Id. 
14 Id.  
15 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 8, Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 
264 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-1473).  
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But this night proved her Waterloo. Her troubles began when 
the bartender refused to make the drink, claiming it was too time 
consuming.16 Undaunted, Ms. Boyer-Liberto quickly dashed through 
the adjoining kitchen to reach another bar manned by a more 
compliant bartender, and then, Hula Hula in hand, she made her way 
back through the kitchen.17 As she weaved through cooks and 
dishwashers, she was accosted by Trudi Clubb, the Food and Beverage 
Manager.18 Ms. Clubb had apparently been trying for some time to get 
Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s attention, and her first audible barrage was “Hey, 
girl that can’t hear.”19 Ms. Clubb berated Ms. Boyer-Liberto for 
cutting through the kitchen; she raised her voice and drew so close she 
sprayed saliva on Ms. Boyer-Liberto, who could feel Ms. Clubb’s 
breath on her face.20 As Ms. Boyer-Liberto walked away, she heard 
Ms. Clubb yell, “I am going to get you … I am going to make you 
sorry.”21 According to Ms. Boyer-Liberto, Ms. Clubb concluded by 
muttering, “Damn [or dang] porch monkey.”22   
Ms. Clubb is White, and Ms. Boyer-Liberto African-American. 
Unamused by Ms. Clubb’s tirade, Ms. Boyer-Liberto complained to 
the Clarion management office the following day.23 She had barely 
begun her account to the hotel’s Food and Beverage Director, Richard 
Heubeck, when Ms. Clubb burst in and announced, “I need to speak to 
you, little girl.”24 When Ms. Boyer-Liberto remonstrated she was 
meeting with Mr. Heubeck, Ms. Clubb retorted, “I am more 
important,” and led her out of the office to an adjoining table.25 After 
the women had seated themselves, Ms. Clubb reprised her lecture of 
the night before, castigating Ms. Boyer-Liberto for passing through the 
                                                 
16 See Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 269. 
17 Id. 
18 See id.  
19 Id.  
20 Id. 
21 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 270. 
22 Id. The record is unclear as to whether Ms. Clubb referred to Ms. Boyer-Liberto as 
a “dang porch monkey” or “damn porch monkey.” Id. The slur refers to the negative 
stereotype of a lazy African American. See Jonathon Green, Porch, GREEN’S 
DICTIONARY OF SLANG, https://greensdictofslang.com/entry/hugtd2y#i4w5tlq (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2017). Ms. Clubb denies using the term “porch monkey.” Boyer-
Liberto, 786 at 270. 
23 Boyer-Liberto, 786 at 270.  
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
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kitchen and angrily shouting, “I’m gonna get you. I’m gonna go to 
[hotel owner] Dr. [Leonard] Berger.”26 According to Ms. Boyer-
Liberto, as the women stood to leave, Ms. Clubb looked directly at her 
and again muttered, “porch monkey.”27 
This time, Ms. Boyer-Liberto formally complained to the 
Clarion Human Resources Director, Nancy Berghauer.28 A write-up of 
her complaint was sent to General Manager Mark Elman, who then 
personally met with Ms. Boyer-Liberto. The complaint also found its 
way to the desk of Dr. Berger, who directed Mr. Elman to fire Ms. 
Boyer-Liberto.29 Mr. Elman, Mr. Heubeck and Ms. Berghauer all met 
with Ms. Boyer-Liberto and dismissed her from her position on 
September 21, five days after her formal complaint.30 Meanwhile, Ms. 
Clubb was issued a written warning, even though she denied having 
called Ms. Boyer-Liberto a “porch monkey” on either occasion.31 
Unfortunately, Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s run of bad luck was not 
over. After lodging a harassment and retaliation complaint with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and then 
filing suit,32 she found herself in a head-on collision with an 
inauspicious decision entered five years before by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. That case, Jordan v. 
Alternative Resources Corp.,33 was commonly viewed as prohibiting 
single-incident workplace harassment claims. This view was adopted 
                                                 
26 Id.  
27 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 270 (4th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc).  
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 3–4, Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 
F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-1473).  
31 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 270. 
32 Ms. Boyer-Liberto asserted claims under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 
42 U.S.C. §1981. Id. at 271. Her Title VII claims, for workplace harassment and 
retaliatory discharge, were asserted against Fontainebleau Corporation, the 
corporation that owned the hotel. Id. Her §1981 claim, for retaliatory discharge, was 
asserted both against Fontainebleau Corporation and Dr. Berger, as the corporate 
owner and the decision maker who directed she be terminated. Id. 
33 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau 
Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 284 (4th Cir. 2015). 
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by Judge James K. Bredar,34 the District Court Judge who threw Ms. 
Boyer-Liberto’s case out on a motion for summary judgment.35 
 
II. JORDAN V. ALTERNATIVE RESOURCES CORPORATION: 
LEGAL PRECEDENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
 
Jordan, like Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s story, makes ugly reading. 
The case arose at the height of the D.C. sniper attacks, which 
terrorized the Washington metropolitan area for most of October 
2002.36 The attacks left ten victims dead and three others critically 
wounded.37 Public hysteria was endemic, whipped up by lurid media 
coverage.38 Since the snipers attacked public places like gas stations 
and parking lots, there were widespread reports of people afraid to 
pump gas or even wheel a shopping cart across supermarket parking 
lots.39 Finally, on October 23, 2002, it was announced that 
Montgomery County police had arrested two suspects, John Allen 
Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo.40  
                                                 
34 Judge Bredar recently received attention after he refused to delay implementation 
of a consent decree created to address issues within the Baltimore City Police 
Department in the wake of the death of Freddie Gray. The Trump administration 
sought, unsuccessfully, to put the reforms on hold. See Brendan McDermid, Judge 
Approves Baltimore Police Decree Over Sessions Concerns, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 7, 
2017, 6:54 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/baltimore-freddie-gray-jeff-sessions-
police-police-brutality-racism-donald-580883. 
35 See Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., No. JKB-12-212, 2013 WL 1413031, at 
* 4–5 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 2013), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).  
36 Jordan, 458 F.3d at 336. 
37 Id. at 337. 
38 The exaggerations and outright fabrications of New York Times reporter Jayson 
Blair forced the paper’s top editors, Howell Raines and Gerald Boyd, to resign. Dan 
Barry, et al., CORRECTING THE RECORD; Times Reporter Who Resigned Leaves 
Long Trail of Deception, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/11/us/correcting-the-record-times-reporter-who-
resigned-leaves-long-trail-of-deception.html?mcubz=1; Jacques Steinberg, Executive 
Editor of the Times and Top Deputy Step Down, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/05/national/executive-editor-of-the-times-and-top-
deputy-step-down.html?mcubz=1. 
39 See Jean Marbella, et al., Shootings Recall Deadlier D.C. Sniper Rampage of 
2002, BALT. SUN (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-
md-fort-meade-sniper-20150304-story.html. 
40 Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 336 (4th Cir. 2006) reh’g en 
banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006).  
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A group of IBM employees, including Jay Farjah and the 
Plaintiff, Robert Jordan, watched the local news on a breakroom 
television set.41 To no one in particular, Farjah – who is White – 
exclaimed, “They should put those two Black monkeys in a cage with 
a bunch of Black apes and let the apes f-k them.”42 Jordan, who is 
Black, overheard the comment, found it offensive, and reported it to 
his supervisors.43 He was then terminated a little less than a month 
later for “being disruptive.”44 
Like Boyer-Liberto, Jordan filed suit under Title VII in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland.45 Like Boyer-Liberto, 
Jordan asserted a claim for retaliatory discharge, based on Jordan’s 
reporting of workplace harassment.46 Unlike Boyer-Liberto, Jordan 
asserted no claim for the underlying harassment itself.47 Judge 
Deborah Chasanow granted the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ruling 
it was not “objectively reasonable” to believe that Farjah’s comment, 
which was not directed at Jordan, could suffice to create “an abusive 
working environment.”48 
Jordan appealed, backed by the EEOC, the Public Justice 
Center and the Metropolitan Washington Employment Lawyers 
Association, all of whom filed amicus briefs.49 Given the conservative 
complexion of the Fourth Circuit panel assigned to the appeal,50 it 
might have gone better for Jordan if his bevy of liberal amici had 
supported the opposition.  
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 337. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 336.  
46 Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 337 (4th Cir. 2006) reh’g en 
banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006). 
47 Jordan, 458 F.3d at 332, 335–36. 
48 Id. at 337–38. See Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., No. Civ.A. DKC 2004-
1091, 2005 WL 736610, at *5, *12 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2005) aff’d 485 F.3d 332 (4th 
Cir. 2006). 
49 Jordan, 458 F.3d at 332, 335–36. 
50 Jordan’s case was heard by Judges Emory Widener, Paul Niemeyer, and Robert 
King. Id. Judges Widener and Niemeyer, who formed the majority, were both 
appointed by Republican presidents. See Judges of the Fourth Circuit Since 1801, 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, 
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/docs/pdfs/historyjudges.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2017). 
Judge King, a Clinton appointee, dissented. See id.; see also Jordan 457 F.3d at 336. 
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The Opinion was written by Judge Niemeyer, who perhaps 
found in the case much to exemplify the temptations of liberalism.51 
Judge Niemeyer’s Opinion seemed to treat Jordan’s debacle as a 
cautionary tale: just as Jordan erred in letting his revulsion at “a single 
abhorrent slur” precipitate him into making an ill-advised complaint, 
so might a well-meaning but misguided judge err in letting the case’s 
bad facts lead to the production of bad law.52 Judge Niemeyer avoided 
the perceived trap.53  
Although Jordan had not asserted a workplace harassment 
claim, Judge Niemeyer devoted much of his Opinion to an explanation 
of why no workplace harassment claim was available to Jordan.54 
Judge Niemeyer emphasized that such claims depended upon 
exposition of a workplace “permeated” with discriminatory 
intimidation, ridicule and insult, an environment in which those 
elements were – to use the Supreme Court’s rubric – so “severe or 
pervasive” as to create an abusive workplace that virtually altered the 
conditions of the employment.55 In assessing the viability of such a 
claim, Judge Niemeyer held, the Courts look to “the frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is accompanied by 
physical threats or humiliation, and whether it unreasonably interferes 
with the plaintiff’s work performance.”56 Applying these factors, 
Judge Niemeyer reasoned that the single incident of invective 
overheard by Jordan could not possibly be said to have transformed 
Jordan’s workplace into the toxic environment proscribed by 
prevailing harassment jurisprudence.57 Then Judge Niemeyer made a 
bit of a leap: Since no workplace harassment claim was available to 
Jordan, then Judge Chasanow was right in holding that it was not even 
                                                 
51 Judge Niemeyer’s Opinion could easily have been written by his father, 
distinguished conservative political theorist Gerhart Niemeyer, who felt that 
“[l]iberalism is essentially sentimental benevolence. Liberals are in love with their 
own feelings rather than the reality at which their benevolence is aiming. If 
Conservatives find liberals repugnant for this reason it must be that they affirm life’s 
reality rather than their own emotions.” Gerhart Niemeyer, Russell Kirk & Ideology, 
30 INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 35, 35–36. (1994). 
52 See Jordan, 458 F.3d at 341.  
53 Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 343 (4th Cir. 2006) reh’g en 
banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006). 
54 Id. at 342–43. 
55 Id. at 339–40. 
56 Id. at 339 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 774, 787–88 (1998)). 
57 Id. at 340. 
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“objectively reasonable” for Jordan to believe that he might have such 
a claim.58 That leap got Judge Niemeyer to the end of his syllogism.59 
Jordan had made no objectively reasonable complaint, his complaint 
was therefore unprotected,60 and Jordan was at the mercy of 
Maryland’s at-will employment doctrine. Unsurprisingly, Judge 
Widener joined with Judge Niemeyer.61  
There was, however, an eloquent dissent by Judge King.62 
Judge King emphasized that, from the beginning, the notion of 
affording protection to workplace whistleblowers had been calculated 
to enable employers to act upon early warnings of workplace 
shenanigans before they ripened into actionable misconduct.63 Judge 
King pointed out that the courts had not only encouraged early, 
preventive reporting of evolving misconduct, but had also dismissed 
the claims of plaintiffs who put off complaining.64 Accurately, Judge 
King characterized Jordan’s plight as a “Catch-22:”65 If Jordan 
complained before full-blown workplace harassment had developed, 
he could be fired with impunity; but if Jordan put off complaining 
until the workplace environment had actually become “permeated” 
with harassment, his procrastination would result in the dismissal of 
his claims.66 Jordan’s counsel, Washington lawyer Stephen Chertkof, 
                                                 
58 See Jordan, 458 F.3d at 341. 
59 Id. at 340–41 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 336. A Nixon appointee, Judge Widener was widely regarded as a senior 
statesman among the Court’s conservatives. H. Emory Widener Jr.; Longtime Judge 
on U.S. Appeals Court, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2007) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/20/AR2007092002531.html. 
62 Jordan, 458 F.3d at 349–59. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 54–57.  
65 Id. at 349. The original “Catch-22” was the centerpiece of Joseph Heller’s 1961 
novel of the same name. In the novel, which dramatized the plight of World War II 
bomber crews, the crewmen found themselves in a Jordan-esque dilemma: if the 
rigors of combat made them crazy, they need only report this to the medical officer, 
and they would be sent home. However, if anyone reported to the medical officer 
that he found combat unendurable, he was obviously saner than his crewmates and 
had no grounds for being sent home. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (Simon & Schuster 
2011) (1961). 
66 Jordan, 458 F.3d at 355. 
Cockey and Hay  
220  U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 17:2 
 
petitioned for en banc review and almost got it.67 Under the Federal 
Rules, an en banc petition will be granted if supported by the votes of 
a majority of the active, sitting judges.68 Chertkof fell one vote short, 
rehearing was denied,69 and Jordan became the bête noir of Fourth 
Circuit workplace harassment law. 
 
III. THE BOYER-LIBERTO CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
 
A. The District Court Case 
 
In applying Jordan to the Boyer-Liberto case, Judge Bredar 
could easily have distinguished Jordan. For starters, Boyer-Liberto 
wasn’t truly a “single incident” case at all. Ms. Boyer-Liberto had 
been called the same racial epithet not once but twice, and it is 
sophistry to rely on the fact they “arose” from a single incident, since 
that would lead to manifest absurdity.70 Imagine, for example, Ms. 
Clubb continuing to call Ms. Boyer-Liberto a “porch monkey” every 
day for a year, conduct which even Judge Niemeyer would probably 
agree “permeated” the workplace, and would not be merely a “single 
incident” harassment. Additionally, Jordan had not been the target of 
the offensive language, but had merely overheard it,71 whereas Boyer-
Liberto was directly targeted.72 In Jordan, the racist invective was 
unaccompanied by any threats against the plaintiff;73 in Boyer-Liberto, 
it was accompanied by threats which unmistakably put the plaintiff’s 
job on the line.74 In Jordan, there was nothing violent or physical 
about the offensive outburst;75 in Boyer-Liberto, the perpetrator 
literally “got up in plaintiff’s face,” spraying her with saliva.76 Finally, 
in Jordan, the offensive remarks were made by someone who was 
                                                 
67 Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 467 F.3d 378, 378 (4th Cir. 2006) (denying 
rehearing en banc) 
68 FED. R. APP. P. 35. 
69 Jordan, 467 F.3d 378. 
70 See Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., No. JKB-12-212, 2013 WL 1413031, at 
*5 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 2013), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).  
71 Jordan, 467 F.3d at 379. 
72 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 269– 70 (4th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc). 
73 Jordan, 467 F.3d at 379. 
74 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 270. 
75 Jordan, 467 F.3d at 379. 
76 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 270. 
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indisputably a mere coworker;77 in Boyer-Liberto, although Ms. 
Clubb’s status presented a bit of a vexed question, there was clearly 
sufficient evidence in the record from which a jury could conclude that 
Ms. Clubb was a manager and not a mere coworker.78 All of this could 
have provided abundant fodder for distinguishing Jordan and allowing 
Boyer-Liberto’s case to go forward. Instead, Judge Bredar took the 
position that Jordan was applicable, eschewing factual and analytical 
nuances.79  
 
B. The Fourth Circuit Case 
 
Ms. Boyer-Liberto appealed and had sufficient cause for 
optimism. In 2008, when Jordan was decided, a bare majority of the 
fifteen judges sitting on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected 
Jordan’s petition for rehearing.80 Since then, several vacancies had 
opened on the Court, which President Obama had filled with 
appointees who were presumably more liberal than the outgoing 
incumbents.81 Because appeals were assigned randomly to three judge 
panels for decision,82 the possibility of Boyer-Liberto drawing at least 
two sympathetic judges was encouraging.  
In what seemed an auspicious omen, Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s case 
was selected for oral argument.83 Unlike many state appellate systems, 
the Federal Appeals system does not guarantee an oral argument in 
every case.84 Whether to assign appeals for oral argument is left up to 
                                                 
77 Jordan, 467 F.3d at 379. 
78 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 270–71. 
79 Judge Bredar’s opinion was a mere four pages. See Boyer-Liberto v. 
Fontainebleau Corp., No. JKB-12-212, 2013 WL 1413031 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 2013), 
rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).  
80 Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 467 F.3d 332, 378 (4th Cir. 2006). 
81 Anne E. Marimow, There’s a Word That No Longer Describes the Federal 
Appeals Court in Richmond, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/theres-a-word-that-no-longer-
describes-the-federal-appeals-court-in-richmond/2017/04/12/3a82e0c4-193c-11e7-
9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html?utm_term=.1d7da4c7b6da. 
82 See 4TH CIR. R. 34(c) (“The Court initially hears and decides cases in panels 
consisting of three judges with the Chief Judge or most senior active judge 
presiding.”). 
83 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d en 
banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).  
84 4TH CIR. R. 34(a). 
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the Federal Circuits to determine and the Fourth Circuit rarely grants 
arguments.85 The Fourth Circuit has the lowest incidence of oral 
argument of any Federal Circuit, and the great majority of appeals in 
the Fourth Circuit are decided without it.86 Thus, when Ms. Boyer-
Liberto’s appeal was selected for oral argument, it indicated that the 
Court was taking her case seriously, and most lawyers would have 
assumed that the Court was entertaining reversal of the district court 
judgment.87 
Whether these harbingers of success would be borne out could 
not be told until the morning of oral argument, since everything 
depended on which judges were assigned the panel. Their identities 
are not disclosed by the Court until “check in,” the pre-hearing ritual 
in which the lawyers report to the Clerk’s office, confirm which 
lawyers will be arguing the case and which are merely “on the brief,” 
and – most critically – are told for the first time which three judges 
will hear the case.88  
Oral argument in the Boyer-Liberto case was held the morning 
of January 29, 2014.89 Counsel for Ms. Boyer-Liberto had made the 
trip from the Eastern Shore the day before, arriving in Richmond in 
the midst of a snow storm.90 But January 29th, though bitter cold, 
dawned bright, sunny, and seemingly full of portent. But here, Ms. 
Boyer-Liberto’s four year run of bad luck kicked in with renewed 
vigor: Even though Republicans were now a minority on the Court,91 
Ms. Boyer-Liberto had drawn a panel comprised exclusively of 
                                                 
85 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS—CASES TERMINATED 
ON THE MERITS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/stfj_b5_630.2016.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2017). 
86 Id.  
87 See id. (showing the low rate of accepted cases). 
88 See 4TH CIR. R. 34(a) (“Because any case may be decided without oral argument, 
all major arguments should be fully developed in the briefs.”). 
89 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d en 
banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).  
90 NAT’L. OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., ISSN 0039-1972, STORM DATA 
(2014). 
91 Marimow, surpa note 81. 
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Republican appointed judges.92 And one of the three – in defiance of 
fifteen-to-one odds – was none other than Judge Niemeyer himself.93  
The other two panelists were both South Carolinians.94 One, 
Judge Dennis Shedd, was a former Strom Thurmond staffer,95 who 
was widely regarded as one of the Court’s staunchest conservatives. 
The other, Chief Judge William Traxler, was generally considered a 
“moderate” – a characterization borne out by events in this case.96 
Going into oral argument that morning, it was clear Ms. Boyer-
Liberto’s only hope lay in persuading the panel the differences 
between Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s story and the facts in Jordan were 
sufficient for her case to warrant a reprieve from Jordan’s seeming 
ban on “single incident” workplace harassment claims. Although oral 
argument in the Fourth Circuit is often spirited, with the judges 
peppering the lawyers with questions and interjections, none of the 
panelists had much to say or ask about the merits of the case; the only 
fireworks came in an exchange with counsel and Judge Niemeyer over 
whether a party’s Answers to Interrogatories could be used to support 
her own opposition to a summary judgment motion,97 a topic of mild 
interest to technically minded lawyers but suitable as a general 
anesthetic for just about everyone else.98 The panelists said nothing to 
which counsel for either side could fasten their hopes in awaiting the 
                                                 
92 The panel consisted of Chief Judge Traxler, Judge Niemeyer, and Judge Shedd. 
Boyer-Liberto, 752 F.3d at 350.  
93 Id. 
94 Judges of the Court, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, 
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/judges/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2017). 
95 Judge Dennis W. Shedd, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, 
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/judges/ judges-of-the-court/judge-dennis-w-shedd (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2017). 
96 Carl Tobias, A New Chief Judge for the Fourth Circuit, WASH. POST (July 8, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-opinions-are-
local/wp/2016/07/08/a-new-chief-judge-for-the-fourth-
circuit/?utm_term=.2c39184962dd. 
97 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350, 355–56 (4th Cir. 2014), 
rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).  
98 It is not surprising Judge Niemeyer was drawn to the topic. Judge Niemeyer is a 
renowned proceduralist and co-author of MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY, which, 
since its publication in 1984, has held near-biblical status as the premier gloss on the 
Maryland Rules. PAUL V. NIEMEYER ET AL., MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY (4th 
ed. 2006). 
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decision, which did not come until almost five months later, on May 
13, in a published opinion.99  
In the Fourth Circuit, as with most intermediate appellate 
courts, the vast majority of decisions are unpublished.100 Lawyers are 
discouraged from citing unreported opinions as authority for any 
proposition.101 Historically, that proscription was quite real and 
certainly easy to obey, since most unpublished opinions were 
inaccessible, even to lawyers.102 However, with the advent of legal 
research archives like WestLaw and Lexis, unreported opinions 
became easy to find. That notwithstanding, published opinions still 
have a totemic significance, as evidenced by Jordan, which, of course, 
was a published opinion.  
Thus, it was yet another Sophoclean continuation of Ms. 
Boyer-Liberto’s sad story that her defeat in the Fourth Circuit came to 
her through a published opinion.103 Authored by Judge Niemeyer, the 
Opinion adopted Judge Bredar’s characterization of the events as 
“single-incident” harassment and adopted Judge Niemeyer’s own 
reasoning in Jordan to reach the conclusion that such harassment 
could not as a matter of law be deemed sufficiently severe or pervasive 
to be actionable.104 As he had done in Jordan, and as Judge Bredar had 
done under the mantle of Jordan, Judge Niemeyer collapsed the rule 
that the plaintiff in a retaliation case must merely have an objectively 
reasonable belief that the subject of his or her complaint is wrongful – 
not a legally accurate belief.105 In effect, Judge Niemeyer again held 
that if the plaintiff gets it wrong, then the complaint could not possibly 
be “objectively reasonable.”106 In short, Judge Niemeyer held that 
                                                 
99 Boyer-Liberto, 752 F.3d at 350. 
100 The courts for the eleven Federal Circuits comprise the penultimate level in the 
Federal Appellate process given the infrequency with which the United States 
Supreme Court agrees to review cases. They are the defacto last resort for most 
litigants.  
101 Citations to unreported opinions is permitted by the rules, but custom discourages 
their use. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1. 
102 Andrew T. Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential: A Recipe for 
Ethical Problems & Legal Malpractice?, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 185, 204 (2007). 
103 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d en 
banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).  
104 See Boyer-Liberto, 752 F.3d 350. 
105 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350, 356–57 (4th Cir. 2014), 
rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).  
106 Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 467 F.3d 332, 379–80 (4th Cir. 2006). 
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neither Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s workplace harassment claim nor her 
retaliation claim was tenable, and affirmed the decision of the District 
Court.107  
Chief Judge Traxler wrote a partial dissent.108 Cryptically, the 
Chief Judge wrote he agreed that, “under existing precedent,” Ms. 
Boyer-Liberto had failed to establish a hostile workplace harassment 
claim.109 But the Chief Judge parted company on Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s 
retaliation claim. Citing Judge King’s invocation of “Catch-22,”110 he 
adopted a phrase from Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s brief, concluding “I cannot 
accept that an employee in circumstances like these can be forced to 
choose between her job and her dignity.”111  
Perhaps the most intriguing part of the Boyer-Liberto Opinion 
was Judge Shedd’s concurrence, which, virtually in its entirely, read as 
follows:  
 
I agree … that, under our precedent, as a matter of law the 
facts of this case do not demonstrate a hostile work 
environment. Based on this Court’s decision in Jordan v. 
Alternative Resources Corp … I agree … that summary 
judgment should also be affirmed on the retaliation claim.112 
 
When the Decision was published, Judge Shedd’s concurrence seemed 
to many readers inscrutable, although its real meaning became clear 
enough through subsequent events.  
 
IV. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, EN BANC 
 
A. Oral Argument 
 
When an appellant loses, she faces three options: the first is to 
accept the outcome, the second is to petition the United States 
                                                 
107 Boyer-Liberto, 752 F.3d at 360. 
108 Id. at 361–63 (Traxler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
109 Id.  
110 Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 349 (4th Cir. 2014), reh’g 
en banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006) (King, J., dissenting).  
111 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350, 763 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d 
en banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).  
112 Id. at 360–61 (Shedd, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
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Supreme Court for certiorari,113 and the third is to petition the Circuit 
Court for rehearing en banc.114 Since the Supreme Court seldom 
grants certiorari, Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s real options were acceptance or 
seeking en banc review. Usually, petitioning for en banc review is 
almost as much a nonstarter as trying to go to the Supreme Court. The 
Fourth Circuit typically grants only two or three such petitions per 
year.115 However, the fact that the Chief Judge had dissented 
suggested that many of his colleagues might – if for no other reason 
than out of deference – agree to give a second chance to a case in 
which he had found merit. Additionally, there was Judge Shedd’s 
concurrence. That one of the Court’s most conservative members had 
declined to join in Judge Niemeyer’s Opinion, and instead had written 
a painfully parsed concurrence, suggested he and perhaps his 
conservative allies on the Court might entertain a reappraisal of the 
principles upon which the case had been decided.116 Finally, students 
of the Fourth Circuit claimed to detect a liberalizing trend in the 
decisions of the Court since the Obama appointees had joined it in the 
years following the Jordan decision.117 Given the changes in the 
ideological makeup of the court,118 it just might be possible to recruit 
the bare majority needed to rehear the case, and even possible to 
persuade that majority either to overrule or distinguish Jordan, were 
rehearing granted. 
Just as in Jordan, the appellant petitioned for rehearing en 
banc, and supporting amicus briefs were filed by the EEOC, the Public 
Justice Center and the Metropolitan Washington Employment 
Lawyers Association.119 It was at this point Ms. Boyer-Liberto got her 
                                                 
113 4TH CIR. R. 41.2. 
114 4TH CIR. R. 35(a). 
115 The Boyer-Liberto case was one of three en banc arguments in 2014. In 2015, the 
following year, there were no en banc arguments. See En Banc Cases, UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, 
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/en-banc-cases (last visited Sep. 24, 2017). 
116 See Brian S. Clarke, The Clash of Old and New Fourth Circuit Ideologies: Boyer-
Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp. and the Moderation of the Fourth Circuit, 66 S.C. L. 
Rev. 927 (providing context as to the shifting political ideology of the Fourth 
Circuit). 
117 See Marimow, supra note 81.  
118 Id. 
119 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc). 
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first break: On July 1, 2014, the Court granted her petition, and agreed 
to rehear the case en banc.120 
The underlying logic of en banc review is that the panel 
decision is vacated, and the entire Court reviews the original decision 
of the District Court.121 There are no new briefs, but there is a brand 
new oral argument before all fifteen judges of the Circuit. In theory, 
during oral argument the lawyers are to address themselves, not to the 
panel decision, but to the merits and demerits of the District Court 
decision,122 and the judges are to adopt the same approach. In practice, 
it is difficult if not impossible to avoid discussion of the panel 
decision, because the three panelists are among the fifteen judges 
rehearing the case, and thus are physically present and typically quite 
active during the rehearing.   
En banc oral arguments are held in the courthouse’s 
ceremonial courtroom.123 The courthouse itself is a massive 
antebellum structure which served during the Civil War as the office 
of Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Most of the courtrooms 
have been “modernized,” and look much like their counterparts all 
over the country, but the ceremonial courtroom is an exception, set up 
like a 19th Century courtroom, full of dark wood and plush carpets.  
At the en banc hearing, the fifteen judges are ranged in a u-
shaped, three-sided phalanx in the front of the courtroom. There is a 
podium in the middle of the room for use by the lawyers, with the 
usual rows of pews behind. Perhaps because of the room’s very high 
ceilings, it is difficult for the lawyer standing at the podium to tell 
which judge is currently speaking: The sound seems to ricochet around 
the room, so that the voice of a judge on the left seems to be coming 
from his counterpart on the right. Some of the judges deal with the 
problem by waving their hands when they speak, but most just let the 
lawyers try to figure it out.  
                                                 
120 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d en 
banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).  
121 4TH CIR. R. 35(c).  
122 Id. (“[G]ranting of rehearing en banc vacates the previous panel judgment and 
opinion; the rehearing is a review of the judgment or decision from which review is 
sought and not a review of the judgment of the panel.”). 
123 Lewis F. Powell, Jr. U.S. Courthouse, Richmond, VA, U.S. GENERAL SERVICES 
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.gsa.gov/historic-buildings/lewis-f-powell-jr-us-
courthouse-richmond-va (last visited Nov. 7, 2017). 
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Unlike most courtroom proceedings, which typically draw a 
handful of onlookers, en banc rehearings often attract a standing room 
only crowd of law students, professors, lawyers, and reporters. Those 
who cannot make the trip to Richmond can listen to a live feed of the 
oral argument.124 The recordings are archived on the court’s website, 
so interested parties who are tied up at the time of oral argument can 
listen at their convenience.125 
Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s rehearing oral argument was held the 
morning of September 18, 2014, four years to the day after she had sat 
in the office of the Clarion’s General Manager and presented her 
complaint.126 Presiding was Chief Judge Traxler, who had written the 
panel decision’s dissent. Although appellate arguments are usually 
subject to rigorous time constraints – fifteen minutes for the Appellant, 
twenty minutes for the Appellee, then five minutes more for the 
Appellant127 – no such restrictions apply to en banc rehearings,128 and 
this one went on for almost two hours, in part because the court had 
allowed additional time for one of the amici, the EEOC, to participate. 
Fourteen of the fifteen judges actively took part, engaging all three 
lawyers with questions and colloquies: The sole exception was Judge 
Niemeyer, who sat silently throughout.129 
Ms. Boyer-Liberto, who attended in person, also sat silently 
throughout. To her, it must have seemed her luck was finally turning. 
From the comments and questions of the judges, it seemed clear most 
felt her complaint should have been protected against retaliation. What 
was not clear was whether the judges would overrule or merely 
distinguish Jordan. Even less clear was the interesting question of 
whether the judges would hold she could actually sue her employer for 
workplace harassment, or merely complain about it. In other words, it 
seemed clear her retaliation claim was likely to be revived, but far 
from clear whether the court would go on to hold that the two 
                                                 
124Listen to Oral Arguments, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, 
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments (last visited 
Sep. 24, 2017). 
125 Id. 
126 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
127 4TH CIR. R. 34(d). 
128 4TH CIR. R. 35 (including no time restrictions for arguments). 
129 Oral Argument: Reya Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT (Sept. 18, 2014), 
http://coop.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/13-1473-20140918.mp3. 
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outbursts of racist invective attributed to Ms. Clubb were sufficient to 
constitute actionable workplace harassment.  
 
B. Historical Developments in Workplace Civil Rights 
 
 To appreciate fully this “moment” of suspense – which lasted 
seven months, until the issuance of the court’s Opinion May 7, 2015130 
– it is necessary to retrace the evolution of workplace civil rights 
protections over the last half-century. In 1964, Congress enacted the 
Civil Rights Act, whose workplace protections were codified in Title 
VII of the Act, and hence became known in the legal profession 
simply as “Title VII.”131 Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer . . .  to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”132 To ensure not only that the Act had teeth but that 
there was someone to do the chewing, Congress simultaneously 
established the EEOC and empowered the agency to entertain 
complaints of violations and to undertake enforcement of the law.133 
The EEOC began promulgating regulations to flesh out the barebones 
protections afforded by Title VII.134 In adopting regulations 
effectuating discrimination based on sex, the EEOC decided it was not 
enough simply to prohibit personnel actions which showed favoritism 
to men.135 The EEOC went further, acknowledging the reality that 
women were often subjected to sexual conditions of employment to 
which men were immune.136 Accordingly, the EEOC regulations 
prohibited quid pro quo sexual harassment, by which submission to 
                                                 
130 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
131 Milestones: 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/50th/milestones/1964.cfm (last visited Sep. 24, 
2017). 
132 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2 (a)(1) (2016). 
133 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-4 (2016). 
134 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (“[I]n 1980 the EEOC 
issued Guidelines specifying that ‘sexual harassment,’ as there defined, is a form of 
sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.”). 
135 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, N-915.048, POLICY GUIDANCE ON 
EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII FOR SEXUAL FAVORITISM (Jan. 12, 1990), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/sexualfavor.html (describing when sexual 
favoritism may become sexual harassment).  
136 Id.  
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sexual advances was made a condition of employment.137 But the 
EEOC went still further. Focusing on the statute’s “terms [and] 
conditions … of employment” language, the EEOC regulations also 
proscribed what came to be known as “hostile environment” sexual 
harassment, reasoning it was a form of discrimination based on sex to 
require employees to work in an environment that had become 
permeated by offensive sexual themes, images, language and/or 
conduct.138 
 For a while, it was unclear whether the courts would support 
the EEOC’s expansion of Title VII to include prohibition of workplace 
sexual harassment. But, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the 
uncertainties were dispelled, as the Supreme Court ruled that both 
types of sexual harassment violated Title VII.139 In holding that the 
Plaintiff had (arguably) framed a claim for hostile environment sexual 
harassment, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, cautioned that, in order to be actionable, workplace 
harassment “must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the 
conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive 
working environment.’”140  
 Courts applying Chief Justice Rehnquist’s formulation of the 
workplace harassment doctrine received additional guidance in 1998, 
in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.141 There, Justice Souter wrote that 
a “recurring point in these [harassment] opinions is that ‘simple 
teasing’ . . . off-hand comments, and isolated incidents, (unless 
extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 
‘terms and conditions of employment.’”142 As in Jordan, some courts 
focused exclusively on the “pervasive” prong of the “severe or 
pervasive” test established by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and interpreted 
                                                 
137 Id. 
138 Id.  
139 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).  
140 Id. at 67 (citations omitted). During the course of an eleven-day trial, Ms. Vinson 
testified that her supervisor “fondled her in front of other employees, followed her 
into the women’s restroom when she went there alone, exposed himself to her, and 
even forcibly raped her on several occasions.” Id. at 60. 
141 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (citations omitted). 
142 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (citations omitted).  
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Justice Souter’s remarks to hold that “isolated incidents” could never 
constitute actionable harassment.143  
 Meanwhile, the trail blazed by the EEOC widened to embrace 
racial harassment, disability harassment and ageist harassment.144 As 
the doctrine of workplace harassment expanded, it became clear the 
courts and the EEOC would interpret Title VII to prohibit any 
workplace environment that had become hostile or abusive based on 
any of the suspect classifications outlined in Title VII or in any of the 
statutes that followed its lead – the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA),145 the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, (PDA)146 and the Age 
Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA).147 As the doctrine of 
workplace harassment expanded, however, its application was 
simultaneously limited by courts who interpreted Meritor148 and 
Faragher149 to apply only to harassment which through repetition had 
become “pervasive.”150 For these courts, the critical “or” dropped out 
of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s formulation. For them, the standard was 
not “severe or pervasive,” but rather “severe and pervasive.”151 
  A full understanding of the dynamic tension underlying the 
Boyer-Liberto case also requires a brief review of the doctrine of 
workplace retaliation. Title VII forbids discrimination against an 
employee “because he [or she] has opposed any practice made . . . 
                                                 
143 Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 340 (4th Cir. 2006) reh’g 
en banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006). See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB, 477 
U.S. at 67; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. Thus, the Fourth Circuit ignored Justice 
Souter’s exception for “isolated incidents” that were “extremely serious.” Id. 
144 The Law, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/50th/thelaw.cfm (last visited Aug. 26, 2017). 
145 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101– 12213 (2016) (prohibiting the disparate treatment of 
individuals on the basis of disability). Title I of the Americans with Disability Act 
addresses discrimination in employment. Id. at §§ 12111–12117. 
146 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2016) (prohibiting disparate treatment of individuals on the 
basis of sex, including if the individual is pregnant). 
147 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2016) (protecting those over age 40 from employment 
discrimination). 
148 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
149 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). 
150 See, e.g., Singleton v. Dep’t of Correctional Educ., 115 F. App’x 119, 122 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (“The conduct that she complains of, though boorish and offensive, is 
more comparable to the kind of rude behavior, teasing, and offhand comments that 
we have held are not sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute actionable sexual 
harassment.”). 
151 Id. 
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unlawful” by Title VII.152 In plain English, an employee cannot be 
retaliated against because he or she complained of workplace 
discrimination. In order to establish a workplace retaliation claim 
under Title VII, an employee must prove “(1) that she engaged in a 
protected activity; (2) that her employer took an adverse employment 
action against her; and (3) that there was a causal link between the two 
events.”153 To be protected, a complaint need not be accurate or well-
founded.154 It need only be based upon a reasonable belief that the 
conduct violates Title VII.155 Or, as the Fourth Circuit itself put it, in a 
2005 case, Title VII protects not only “employment actions actually 
unlawful under Title VII but also employment actions an employee 
reasonably believes to be unlawful.”156 But here, too, there was a 
countervailing limitation: As evidenced by Jordan157 and the panel 
decision in Boyer-Liberto,158 some courts took the position that if the 
complainant got it wrong, and the conduct about which she 
complained was not actually unlawful, then, ipso facto, no one could 
reasonably believe it was unlawful.  
 It was at the convergence of these two threads of developing 
jurisprudence that the Boyer-Liberto case arose. If, as some courts had 
held, workplace harassment was not actionable until it had fully 
ripened through a series of recurrent incidents, and if, as some courts 
had (in effect) held, a workplace complaint was only protected if it 
targeted fully ripened misconduct, then someone like Ms. Boyer-
Liberto would have to put up with the offensive mistreatment until it 
became “pervasive.”159 But, if she did, as Judge King and Chief Judge 
                                                 
152 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2016). 
153 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm. v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 405–
06 (4th Cir. 2005). 
154 Id. at 407.  
155 Id.  
156 Id. at 406. 
157 Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 340–41 (4th Cir. 2006) 
reh’g en banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006). 
158 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350, 359 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d 
en banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).  
159 Id. at 358 (“Liberto has not pointed to any Fourth Circuit case, nor could she, 
finding the presence of a hostile work environment based on a single incident.”); see 
also Jordan, 458 F.3d at 341 (noting that, based on the plaintiff’s observations, the 
plaintiff must reasonably believe the “violation is actually occurring.”). 
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Traxler had warned in their dissents,160 she ran the risk of seeing her 
complaint dismissed under long-standing Supreme Court precedent to 
the effect that early complaints were to be encouraged, for the sake of 
prevention, and tardy claims were to be dismissed.161 In effect, the 
Supreme Court had fashioned a constitutional version of the equity 
doctrine of laches, by which someone who “sleeps on his rights” 
forfeits them through inaction.162 And that, of course, created the 
“Catch-22” against which both judges cautioned: If you complain in 
time to prevent misconduct from developing into full blown 
harassment, your complaint is unprotected because it is premature; 
but, if you defer complaining until the acts of harassment have become 
sufficiently “pervasive” to frame actionable harassment, then your 
complaint will be dismissed because it is tardy.        
  While legal scholars wondered how these legal doctrines 
would align in the Boyer-Liberto en banc decision,163 astrologers 
might well have wondered at the alignment of the stars, for it is as an 
interesting coincidence that the Jordan decision,164 the original Boyer-
Liberto panel decision165 and the Boyer-Liberto en banc166 decision 
                                                 
160 Boyer-Liberto, 752 F.3d at 363 (Traxler, J., dissenting) (noting that employees 
experiencing discrimination can either report misconduct and be fired or remain in a 
hostile environment); Jordan, 458 F.3d at 341, 349 (King, J., dissenting) (stating that 
the majority’s ruling has placed “employees who experience racially discriminatory 
conduct in a classic ‘Catch–22’”). 
161 Known as the “Ellerth/Faragher defense,” employees are required to report 
misconduct in a timely manner in order to prevent hostile environments from 
developing, or risk dismissal of future claims. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton 
524 U.S. 775, 806–07 (1998) (stating that failing to report discrimination through the 
employer’s preventative system could result in the plaintiff not recovering damages 
for any preventable discrimination suffered); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (noting that an affirmative defense to an 
employer’s vicarious liability has two elements: “(a) that the employer exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and 
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
otherwise.”). 
162 Laches, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). See cases cited supra note 
161. 
163 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc). 
164 Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir.) reh’g en banc 
denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006)  
165 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350, 763 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d 
en banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).  
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were all issued under the sign of Taurus the bull; Jordan having been 
handed down May 12, 2006, the first Boyer-Liberto decision May 13, 
2014 and the Boyer-Liberto en banc decision May 7, 2015.167 And, in 
a dramatic turn around, the majority opinion was written by Judge 
King, who had authored the Jordan dissent.168 
 
V. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S REASONING 
 
Not surprisingly, Judge King’s Opinion, written on behalf of a 
dozen judges, partakes a bit of a victory lap. Although acknowledging 
that Jordan could easily be distinguished from the facts in Boyer-
Liberto, Judge King and his colleagues held that Jordan was overruled 
to the extent it conflicted with their rulings in Boyer-Liberto.169 In a 
closely reasoned, fourteen page decision, the majority cited Justice 
Souter’s language in Faragher170 for the proposition that an “isolated 
incident” could suffice to create an actionable hostile work 
environment “if extremely serious.”171 Observing that comparisons to 
lesser primates (apes, monkeys, gorillas)172 were singularly repugnant 
forms of racist invective, comparable to use of the n-word, and noting 
that the attacks on Boyer-Liberto were accompanied by a degree of 
physicality and by the evident ability to effectuate them, the majority 
held that Boyer-Liberto had alleged facts sufficient to take her hostile 
work environment claim beyond summary judgment, to final 
resolution by the jury.173 But, the majority cautioned, even if the two 
racist tirades were insufficient to frame a cause of action for hostile 
workplace harassment, it was still objectively reasonable for Boyer-
Liberto to regard them as unlawful and hence for her complaint to be 
                                                                                                                   
166 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d. at 285. 
167 See supra notes 163–66 
168 Jordan, 458 F.3d at 349 (King, J., dissenting); Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 268.  
169 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 269. 
170 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). 
171 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 285–86. 
172 The majority in the Boyer-Liberto en banc decision point out the especially 
odious nature of the insult “porch monkey.” Id. at 280. The Court places the 
remark within the historical context that “[p]rimate rhetoric has been used to 
intimidate African–Americans’ and that ‘[t]he use of the term “monkey” and other 
similar words,’ including the variation “porch monkey,” has ‘been part of 
actionable racial harassment claims across the country.’” Id. at 280 (citing Green 
v. Franklin Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis, 459 F.3d 903, 911 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
173 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 280–81. 
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protected against retaliation.174 The majority resolved the “Catch-22” 
previously identified by Judge King and Chief Judge Traxler in favor 
of preventive maintenance.175 The victim of workplace invective need 
not wait until it had assumed the dimensions of full blown harassment, 
nor – as suggested by Judge Niemeyer in Jordan – did she have to 
establish that a “plan was afoot” to do so, but could instead complain 
of her mistreatment with impunity, at least where the invective was 
“physically threatening or humiliating.”176 Interestingly, and 
presumably because the majority explicitly overruled Jordan, Judge 
Shedd joined in the majority opinion.177 
Judge Niemeyer, of course, dissented.178 Judge Niemeyer pointed 
out it was unnecessary to overrule Jordan to justify the outcome 
reached by the majority.179 The outcome was itself insupportable, in 
his view, because the very nature of a claim based on the creation of a 
hostile work environment depends upon the pollution of that 
environment through repetition.180 Since the two episodes of racist 
invective in Boyer-Liberto arose from the same incident, they could 
not support a claim for hostile workplace harassment.181 And, absent 
some evidence the harassment was likely to recur, they could not form 
the basis for a protected complaint, because it was not objectively 
reasonable to believe that an actionable hostile environment was 
evolving: 
 
While Liberto had every right to be offended by Clubb’s use of a 
racial epithet and acted reasonably and responsibly in reporting the 
incident . . . she lacked a reasonable belief . . . that she was 
opposing her employer’s commission of ‘a[ ] practice made . . . 
unlawful . . . by [Title VII]’ . . . [f]or that reason … as a matter of 
law . . . she did not engage in protective activity . . .182 
 
                                                 
174 Id. at 285. 
175 Id. at 284.  
176 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 284. But see Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 
458 F.3d 332, 340 (4th Cir.) reh’g en banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006).  
177 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 268. 
178 Id. at 293 (Neimeyer, J., dissenting).  
179 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 303 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
180 Id. at 294–95. 
181 Id. at 303. 
182 Id. at 305. 
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In other words, Ms. Boyer-Liberto had every right to complain about 
her mistreatment, and her boss had every right to fire her. 
Between the majority’s fourteen pages and the dissent’s thirteen, 
were nestled a little more than three pages authored by Judge 
Wilkinson, joined by Judge Agee.183 Literally and analytically, they 
occupied the middle ground. Although acknowledging “that a good 
workplace environment is poisoned by the kind of remarks alleged 
here is an understatement,” Judge Wilkinson found Ms. Clubb’s two 
outbursts insufficient to impute liability to her employer for the 
creation of a hostile workplace environment.184 However, Judge 
Wilkinson went on to conclude that “Liberto’s belief that a hostile 
work environment existed or was coming into existence was 
objectively reasonable,” and hence he joined in the majority’s 
conclusion that Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s retaliation claim should have 
survived summary judgment.185 Although Judge Wilkinson did agree 
that, “under the circumstances presented here,” complaining about the 
harassment was “objectively reasonable” and hence protected, he 
chided the majority for their insensitivity to “the dangers of over-
reporting,” which, in his view, “drifts every so casually toward 
draconian consequences for mere utterance and speech.”186 If, Judge 
Wilkinson warned, courts became overzealous in taxing employers for 
reckless statements by workers that offend co-workers, then the 
workplace would become polarized along lines drawn by race and 
gender, with employees afraid to speak to each other freely or at all; 
moreover, employers would be driven “into the role of censors,” all at 
the cost of free speech.187 
 
VI. THE FUTURE OF WORKPLACE HARASSMENT CLAIMS 
 
                                                 
183 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 288 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkinson, a 
former Chief Judge of the circuit, has elsewhere expounded the view that a 
proliferation of civil rights litigation has engendered the suppression of free speech 
and also, perversely, worsened race relations. See, J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, ONE 
NATION INDIVISIBLE: HOW ETHNIC SEPARATISM THREATENS AMERICA (1997).  
184 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 288–90 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
185 Id. at 290. 
186 Id. at 290–92. 
187 Id. at 289. 
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Following the en banc decision, Ms. Boyer- Liberto’s case was 
returned to District Court in Baltimore.188 Judge Bredar referred the 
parties to a settlement conference, which quickly led to a resolution of 
the case.189 Ms. Boyer-Liberto has moved on, but the remarkable final 
act of her five-year courtroom drama changed the law of the land. It is 
clear the en banc decision in Boyer-Liberto190 has displaced Jordan191 
as the touchstone for workplace harassment and retaliation claims, but 
what does that portend? Certainly, it provides greater security for 
workers unwilling to tolerate workplace racism and little detriment to 
workplace comradery and freedom of aggression. 
 
A. While Judge Niemeyer’s Dissent May Appear to Present a 
Workable Solution to the Unique Challenges of Workplace 
Harassment, it is Untenable in Practice and the Majority 
was Correct to Reject it. 
 
Given that Judge Niemeyer was the only dissenting voice out 
of fifteen judges, it seems unlikely his views will be adopted by any 
three-judge panel of the court.192 But, as evidenced by the fact the 
Jordan dissent193 eventually became the majority view adopted by 
twelve out of fifteen judges, it is unwise to ignore a cogently argued 
dissent. Looking first at Judge Niemeyer’s rejection of Ms. Boyer-
Liberto’s hostile work environment claim, one notes with interest it 
devolves – like the majority opinion – from an interpretation of Justice 
Souter’s pronouncement that “isolated incidents, (unless extremely 
serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and 
conditions of employment.”194  
                                                 
188 Id.at 288 (majority opinion). 
189 The substance of that resolution is confidential. If the case had continued 
another six weeks, it would have been five years since the incident that sparked the 
lawsuit. 
190 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 268–69. 
191 Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2006) reh’g 
en banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006)  
192 Unless, of course, fate joins him with Judges Wilkinson and Agee, which might 
augur bad news for a plaintiff complaining of workplace harassment. 
193 Jordan, 458 F.3d at 349 (King, J., dissenting). 
194 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998); Boyer-Liberto v. 
Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 294 (4th Cir. 2015) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).  
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Judge Niemeyer points out that Justice Souter referred to 
“isolated incidents,” in the plural, from which he infers that a hostile 
workplace environment will only arise through the repetition of 
multiple “isolated incidents.”195 But that inference, as they say, gets 
him “into the weeds,” because, by definition, an isolated incident is 
isolated. If something happens and then is repeated, it makes no sense 
to refer to it as an “isolated incident,” because the fact that it is 
repeated suggests it is in no way “isolated.”196 Upon reflection, it 
seems safer to assume, as the majority evidently did, that what Judge 
Souter meant was that “an isolated incident, (unless extremely serious) 
will not amount to a discriminatory change in the terms and conditions 
of employment.”197 Semantic niceties aside, Judge Niemeyer seems to 
have given short shrift to the genesis of the workplace harassment 
doctrine, which lay in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s holding that the 
EEOC was right to proscribe workplace harassment that was 
“sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the 
victim’s] employment.”198 Certainly, the Chief Justice’s holding 
allowed abundantly for the possibility that a single horrific event 
might “be sufficiently severe” to “create an abusive working 
environment.”199  
Turning to Judge Niemeyer’s handling of the retaliation claim, 
it appears he suggests a new and promising standard. If the harassment 
about which the plaintiff complains seems “likely to recur,” then it is 
objectively reasonable to complain about it and the complaint will be 
protected.200 On its face, the “likely to recur” standard presents an 
ingenious solution to the early reporting dilemma. If an outburst of 
racist invective seems just that – an extemporaneous outburst, unlikely 
to be repeated – then reporting it to upper management might arguably 
be seen as an overreaction and therefore unprotected; conversely, if 
the perpetrator seems to be acting upon some plan or design, or 
otherwise appears to be the sort of person for whom the use of racial 
epithets might be habitual, then reporting it immediately seems a 
                                                 
195 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 294 (discussing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788). 
196 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. 
197 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 285–86. 
198 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted).  
199 Id.  
200 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 304 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).  
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defensible precaution and therefore entitled to legal protection.201 
However, it is difficult to imagine what would earmark an act of 
harassment as “likely to recur.” Oddly, the one thing that would seem 
to qualify would be the fact that it does recur, as in Boyer-Liberto. In 
Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s case, the perpetrator allegedly subjected her to a 
racial epithet, and then, the very next day, targeted her again with 
precisely the same racial epithet.202 Given that the harassment in this 
case did recur, it seems plausible to suppose it likely will recur again, 
but yet Judge Niemeyer – the would-be creator of the “likely to recur” 
standard – would have none of it.203 All this suggests that the “likely to 
recur” standard is unworkably nebulous, and the majority was wise not 
to adopt it. 
 
B. While Judge Wilkinson’s Concurrence Presents Persuasive 
Concerns Surrounding Freedom of Speech in the 
Workplace, those Concerns are Outweighed by the Benefits 
of the Majority Approach 
 
The concurrence by Judge Wilkinson sounds warnings that 
seem prescient and are expressed with an eloquence that undoubtedly 
will win supporters.204 Heightening the responsibility of employers for 
the hurtful words of their employees will likely make employers and 
employees more vigilant in self-policing – perhaps at the expense of 
candor or even at the expense of wholesome debate.205 Making racist 
and sexist language risky may well induce cautious employees to stay 
away from co-workers of a different race or of the opposite gender. 
                                                 
201 See Amy Gallow, How to Respond to an Offensive Comment at Work, HARV. BUS 
REV. (Feb. 8, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/02/how-to-respond-to-an-offensive-
comment-at-work (“There’s no denying that this is a tough situation. Joan Williams, 
founding director of the Center for WorkLife Law at UC Hastings College of the 
Law, says that these decisions are particularly risky because they involve “two of the 
most corrosive elements of bias in the workplace:” the uncertainty that whether what 
you heard is bias and the fear that you might be penalized for how you handle it. It’s 
normal to question ourselves in these situations, wondering whether we heard the 
person right or if it was just a joke.).  
202 Id. at 270 (majority opinion). 
203 Id. at 304–05 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
204 See Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 288–93 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). 
205 Id. at 289.  
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Depending upon one’s ideology, this may not turn out to be “a good 
thing.” But this case does not truly present any of these dangers.  
Prohibiting the use of racial epithets should not inhibit the free 
speech of anyone, and, to the extent there was any debate or discourse 
in this case, it concerned neither politics nor religion nor the 
expression of any ideas at all, but rather, the advisability of cutting 
through the kitchen.206 So, while Judge Wilkinson’s concurrence holds 
interest to those who ponder the advisability of civil rights litigation 
and civil rights laws, it has little direct relevance to the 
“circumstances” of this case (as he acknowledges), and, frankly, it is 
hard to envision a case upon which it would have a decisive bearing.  
Perhaps the real problem, in Judge Wilkinson’s view – which 
he makes implicit here but has made explicit elsewhere207 – is that 
prohibiting even overtly racist invective arguably subverts racial unity 
by imposing race-based restrictions upon speech.208 The underlying 
premise is that the law should be truly colorblind and race–based 
government measures designed to assist minorities, such as affirmative 
action, ethnic quotas and, as in this case, protection against racist 
abuse, should be prohibited.209 It is an application of the old 
playground monitor conundrum. If the teacher intervenes to protect the 
bespectacled, violin-toting waif who is being bullied, there is always 
the risk that her well-intended intervention will backfire, resulting 
either in drawing more abuse upon the victim when her back is turned, 
or result in the victim becoming utterly shunned and isolated. And it is 
certainly true that intervening to protect individuals and groups who 
would otherwise be oppressed inevitably calls attention to their 
separateness and engenders resentment from those who would prefer 
there be no intervention.210 But without the intervention, what will 
there be but a continuation of the status quo?  
Hoping that white supremacists will somehow come to 
embrace cultural diversity on their own is as realistic as expecting that 
a playground gang will somehow develop an appreciation for classical 
                                                 
206 Id. at 269. 
207 See J. HARVEY WILKINSON, III, ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE: HOW ETHNIC 
SEPARATISM THREATENS AMERICA (1997) (discussing the dangers of racial division, 
including how affirmative action contributes to that divide). 
208 See Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 288–93 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  
209 Id.  
210 Id. at 292–93. 
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music and the fashion potential of well-styled eyewear. It seems sad 
that a country founded upon broad principles of equality for all men, 
and upon tolerance of all ideas and creeds, should now require special 
civil rights laws and a legion of civil rights lawyers, to ensure that 
those principles find practical expression in the workplace, but such is 
the case. Our civil rights laws are not without their deleterious side 
effects, but like any strong medicine, they are worth it. If we are not 
willing to concede the field to the bullies of this world, then we must 
be willing to act forcefully to tax speech that is not merely 
disrespectful, that is not merely frank or impetuous, but which would 
actually deny its targets the fundamental human dignity our laws 
guarantee them.  
 
 
 
 
 
C. The Majority Presents an Appropriate Solution to a 
Complex Problem, Eliminating the Catch-22 of Jordan and 
Creating a Workable Standard for Courts to Apply in the 
Future 
 
In assessing the durability of the majority opinion, the clear 
starting point is the fact that half of the opinion – resuscitating Ms. 
Boyer-Liberto’s retaliation claim – enjoyed the support of fourteen out 
of fifteen judges, and the other half – resuscitating her workplace 
harassment claim – enjoyed the support of twelve. But to that must be 
added the observation that the opinion just makes sense. It is illogical 
to expect employees to put up with racist invective in the workplace, 
and counterproductive to put them at risk for reporting it before it gets 
worse.211 Moreover, if it takes a horde of lawyers, judges, and EEOC 
bureaucrats five years to figure out whether calling somebody a “porch 
monkey” more than once constitutes actionable workplace harassment, 
how can we expect a layperson to risk her job in a gamble on getting it 
right?  
Providentially, the majority opinion restored the “objectively 
reasonable” rule, which had gotten only lip service in Jordan and in 
                                                 
211 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp, 786 F.3d 264, 288 (4th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc) (majority opinion). 
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the original Boyer-Liberto panel decision.212 And, wisely, the majority 
opinion resolved the harassment-reporting Catch-22 in favor of early, 
preventive reporting.213 Judge Niemeyer was technically correct in 
observing that, having effectively distinguished Jordan, the majority 
did not need to overrule it. However, overruling it was nonetheless 
right. Just as, at common law, where every dog got one “free bite,” 214 
Jordan effectively enshrined the “free bite” rule for workplace 
harassment and that simply cannot be good law. Moreover, Jordan 
stood for the untenable proposition that for a complaint of workplace 
misconduct to be protected the layperson making it had to get it 
right.215 Ultimately, whether the complaint was protected because the 
complainer “got it right” depended on variables such as whether Judge 
Niemeyer or Judge King got the case, with the result that workers truly 
did have to choose between their dignity and their job.216 Finally, 
Jordan created a lose-lose dilemma for abused employees, who had to 
choose between losing their job through premature complaints or 
losing their lawsuit through tardy complaints.217 Jordan was bad law 
and its passing should not be mourned. 
Judge Niemeyer’s dissent gets it wrong because his workplace 
harassment analysis depends on an unmanageable “likely to recur” 
standard, and his retaliation analysis depends on discarding the 
“objectively reasonable” standard in favor of protecting only 
complaints that are well-founded, as determined by neoconservative 
legal tenets. Judge Wilkinson’s concurrence is overly concerned with 
open debate and racial unity, neither of which truly depend upon the 
use of racist invective at work. Judge King’s majority opinion is 
correct and should endure because it slays all the dragons. It puts the 
“or” back in “severe or pervasive,” it restores the “objectively 
reasonable” standard, it resolves the reporting Catch-22 in favor of 
early reporting, and it eliminates the “first bite” defense for workplace 
harassers.  
Of course, we are still left with a somewhat uncharted border 
between offensive, “stray” remarks which do not alter the terms or 
                                                 
212 Id. at 284. 
213 Id.  
214 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 509 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).  
215 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 283. 
216 See supra Section III.A. for a description of the impact of the composition of the 
judges. 
217 Jordan, 458 F.3d at 343.  
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conditions of employment, and offensive remarks which do. 
Ironically, it often is impossible for an employee to tell which is which 
until she reports. If the employer responds appropriately, then the 
episode may be written off as merely the rudeness of a co-worker; but 
if, conversely, the complainant gets fired, then the terms or conditions 
of employment have been altered, because they now apparently 
include submission to racist invective. By encouraging early reporting, 
the Boyer-Liberto en banc decision makes it easier for employees to 
get to the truth and to survive the trip. That is good law.  
In the two years that have followed the Boyer-Liberto en banc 
decision, that decision has been cited multiple times in opinions 
dispersed throughout the country.218 Most, however, have cited the 
case simply as an affirmation of long-standing principles governing 
the law of workplace harassment and retaliation.219 A significant 
exception was a decision by Judge Bredar himself, who invoked the 
decision to afford protection to a woman who complained of sexual 
harassment based upon a single incident which, prior to Boyer-Liberto, 
most courts would not have regarded as sufficient to support a claim of 
hostile environment sexual harassment. 220 
The case also engendered numerous commentaries in the popular 
press and in blogs and webpage op-ed pieces by the employment 
bar.221 Perhaps not unsurprisingly, the case was sensationalized by 
reporters and vilified by management-side employment lawyers as 
standing for the proposition that a single incident of “insensitive” 
remarks would suffice to support federal civil rights claims.222 This 
                                                 
218 See, e.g., Castleberry v. STI Group, 836 F.3d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 2017); Equal 
Emp’t Opportunity Comm. v. Rite Way Serv., Inc., 819 F.3d 235, 242 n.5 (5th Cir. 
2016). 
219 See cases cited supra note 218.  
220 See Jones v. Family Health Care Centers of Balt. Inc., 135 F. Supp.3d 372, 379 
(D. Md. 2015). 
221 See, e.g., Paul Mollica, Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., No. 13-1473 (4th 
Cir. May 7, 2015), DAILY DEVELOPMENTS IN EEO LAW (May 8, 2015), 
http://www.employmentlawblog.info/2015/05/boyer-liberto-v-fontainebleau-corp-
no-13-1473-4th-cir-may-7-2015.shtml; Matthew F. Nieman & Jeremy S. Schneider, 
Fourth Circuit Sets Employee-Friendly Standard for Title VII Retaliation Claims, 
JACKSON LEWIS P.C (May 15, 2015), https://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources-
publication/fourth-circuit-sets-employee-friendly-standard-title-vii-retaliation-claims 
222 See, e.g.,  Matthew F. Nieman and Jeremey S. Schneider, Fourth Circuit Sets 
Employee-Friendly Standard for Title VII Retaliation Claims (May 15, 2015), 
https://www.jacksonlewis.com/Resourcess-publication/fourth-circuit-sets-employee-
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approach was adopted by a review article on the case, by a Boston 
College law student who echoed Judge Wilkinson’s warning that the 
majority opinion blurred the line between mere insensitivity and abuse 
in a manner which, perversely, would actually hamper race 
relations.223 On the other hand, a widely-disseminated commentary by 
Robert Fitzpatrick, a prominent plaintiff’s employment lawyer, praised 
the decision for overturning Jordan and touted it as a harbinger of 
liberal trends in federal employment law.224 This view was adopted by 
South Carolina law professor Brian S. Clarke, who cited the case as a 
stand out illustration of how the Fourth Circuit, once regarded as the 
most conservative federal judiciary in America, had drifted far to the 
left.225 
Amidst the debate, perhaps it is wise to cling to a few facts. First, 
calling an African-American a “porch monkey” is not merely rude or 
“insensitive.” As the Court noted, likening someone to a jungle animal 
is grossly offensive, and likening African-Americans to jungle animals 
carries with it considerable historical baggage.226 Moreover, while use 
of racist invective by a manager or even a co-worker is obnoxious, it is 
particularly so where, as in the Boyer-Liberto case, it became clear 
that it could be done with impunity and with the acquiescence of upper 
management.227 Third, in Boyer-Liberto, Plaintiff had to endure the 
                                                                                                                   
friendly-standard-title-vii-retaliation-claims (“Although it is unlikely that this 
decision will cause a stampede to the courthouse, employees (or their counsel) may 
raise claims of retaliation in their discrimination complaints more often than they 
might have previously. This relaxed standard means that arguments that offensive, 
yet isolated, conduct is neither severe nor pervasive enough to establish 
discrimination are no longer as strong. It also brings a higher likelihood that 
retaliation claims will survive summary judgment and, therefore, proceed to trial 
(and a jury)”). 
223 See Sean Ahern, Note, Waving Goodbye to Your Rights: Retaliation and 
Invalidity in the Context of Waivers Under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA, 97 
B.U. L. REV. 659, 676 (2017). 
224 See Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Fourth Circuit Overturns Decade of Precedent in 
Blockbuster En Banc Hostile Work Environment Decision, FITZPATRICK ON 
EMPLOYMENT LAW (May 15, 2015, 7:40 PM), 
http://robertfitzpatrick.blogspot.com/2015/05/ 
225 Brian S. Clarke, The Clash of Old and New Fourth Circuit Ideologies: Boyer-
Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp. and the Moderation of the Fourth Circuit, 66 SOUTH 
CAROLINA L. REV. 940 (2015). 
226 See supra note 22. 
227 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 270–71 (4th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc). 
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same racial slur not once but twice, a sequence of events which could 
be characterized as “isolated” only by splitting quite a few semantic 
and logical hairs.228 Thus, at least on its actual facts, the opinion in 
Boyer-Liberto did not take the Court particularly close to the 
worrisome border between workplace invective that is merely 
insensitive and workplace invective that constitutes intolerable racial 
abuse. 
These distinguishing factors, moreover, should provide a roadmap 
for those who wish to carry forward the principles laid down in the 
Boyer-Liberto decision. It is reasonable to expect the courts will 
observe the distinction between invective that is based upon a suspect 
classification, (“n-gger,” “kike,” “geezer,” and perhaps “faggot” and 
“dyke”), and invective that is merely rude (“jerk,” “knucklehead,” 
etc.). The first is socially and legally unacceptable,229 while the latter 
is merely socially unacceptable. Moreover, even overtly racist 
invective uttered randomly by a co-worker or even a manager is less 
obnoxious to our constitutional values than is workplace invective that 
enjoys the complicity or tacit approval of upper management.230 
Lastly, even a paragon of political correctness might be capable of an 
angry outburst that goes beyond mere discourtesy, and even a paragon 
might top off such an outburst with a dose of racist, sexist, or ageist 
invective. If, for example, Ms. Clubb had called Ms. Boyer-Liberto a 
porch monkey and then apologized the next day, the case probably 
never would have gotten to court and if it had it probably would have 
been dismissed under the “stray remarks” doctrine.231 Repetition 
necessarily implies premeditation, making the perpetrator’s course of 
conduct actionable. 
If, indeed, a worker’s self-expression will be “chilled” by a 
workplace ban on racist invective, then that is probably a good thing. 
If, moreover, a worker truly feels the only way he can avoid racially 
abusing co-workers is to stay away from them, then that is probably a 
good thing. If there is a bottom line, it is that zero tolerance for racist 
                                                 
228 Id. at 270.  
229 Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir. 2001). 
230 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 270–71.  
231 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (“Thus, stray remarks in 
the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual harassment . . .  cannot justify 
requiring the employer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on 
legitimate criteria.”). 
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conduct and language in the workplace, even if zealously enforced by 
the courts, should impair no one in the performance of their job duties, 
the expression of their opinions, or their choice of who to sit next to in 
the lunch room.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There is an old saying that making law is like making sausage: not 
for the squeamish. But that is a saying about legislation, which, in our 
country, is only half the story of how laws are made. The other half is 
the refinement of law through litigation, which could more aptly be 
likened to a bingo game, since it is driven by seemingly random 
events. This tale never would have been told, and the hard work that 
made it known people need not choose between their jobs and their 
dignity, never would have been done, if the nameless barfly who 
started it all had just ordered a Bud Light. The law is a mighty 
machine, but its cogs and pistons turn on tiny hinges. 
 
 
